State Department UAP Cable DOS-UAP-D3: "UFOs over Georgia" — Moscow's Bold Lie, October 2001

Source file: 059uap00011.pdf Originating agency: Department of State (U.S. Embassy Moscow) Cable MRN: 01 MOSCOW 13169 Cable date: October 30, 2001 / 300000Z Oct 01 From: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW To: SECSTATE WASHDC Info: AMEMBASSY TBILISI, USUN, MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE, AMEMBASSY BAKU, AMEMBASSY YEREVAN, USOSCE, SECDEF, JOINT STAFF Original classification: CONFIDENTIAL (classified by POLMINCOUNS George Krol, reason 1.5 (B/D)) Declassification date: February 25, 2026, by John Powers, Acting Director, U.S. Department of State Page count: 5 TAGS: PREL, MARR, KCFE, UN, OSCE, GG, RS References: (A) MOSCOW 13072 (B) TBILISI 3087

---

Official Blurb

State Department UAP Cable 3, Tbilisi, Georgia, October 30, 2001. On October 28–29, there was an incident alleged by the Georgian Foreign Ministry that Russian aircraft had violated Georgian airspace and bombed areas of the Kodori Gorge. Russians denied any of the claims and said that it could have been UFOs. Cable authors note that Russians typically engage in the "bold lie" when they wish to conceal actions.

Summary

The cable bearing the subject line "UFOS OVER GEORGIA: STRANGE ENCOUNTERS OF AN MFA KIND" is a front-row record of an extraordinary moment in the diplomatic history of unidentified aerial phenomena. On October 30, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Alexander Vershbow met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and raised reports from Tbilisi that Russian aircraft had violated Georgian airspace and bombed areas of the Kodori Gorge on October 28–29, 2001.

Mamedov denied it categorically, citing the Russian Ministry of Defense. The chief of the Georgian desk at Russia's Foreign Ministry, Tereoken, joined in the denial and then added a remarkable aside: he suggested that reports of aircraft in the area might just as well have been reports about "UFOs." The remark was delivered in a formal tone, though not without a trace of mordant humor. In the final analytical paragraph, the cable's authors are sharp and unambiguous: the Russian denials "reflect a traditional Russian penchant to avoid an awkward admission with a bold lie." This is, with near-certainty, a case in which the "UFO" served as a diplomatic tool, not as a description of a physical phenomenon.

---

Research Article

Introduction: The Geopolitical Context of October 2001

To grasp the significance of this cable one must place it in historical context. October 2001 was one of the most turbulent months of the early twenty-first century. Fewer than seven weeks had passed since the September 11 attacks. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan had begun on October 7, less than three weeks before the cable. The United States needed Russian cooperation, and this was a moment of relative warming between Washington and Moscow under Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. A bilateral summit was scheduled for the coming days in the United States.

Against this backdrop a three-sided crisis was unfolding in the Caucasus.

First, Georgia under President Eduard Shevardnadze was a weak and fractured state. Abkhazia, a northwestern province with a Black Sea coastline, had declared de facto independence after the 1992–1993 war and was under Russian patronage. South Ossetia was in a similar situation. Russia maintained military bases in Georgia, including the base at Gudauta in Abkhazia, which under the 1999 Istanbul Agreement (within the CFE framework) were supposed to close.

Second, the Pankisi Gorge in northeastern Georgia had become a refuge for Chechen refugees and, according to Russian accusations, for Chechen guerrillas as well. Russia had long demanded that Georgia eliminate the Chechen presence in Pankisi; Tbilisi maintained it lacked the operational capacity to do so. The Pankisi tension served Moscow as a persistent lever of pressure.

Third, the Kodori Gorge — the valley at the center of this cable — occupies the upper reaches of Abkhazia and was one of the only areas of the breakaway province still partially under Georgian control in 2001. Svans (Georgian ethnic group) lived there, and Georgian partisan forces occasionally operated against Abkhaz authority. The area was an active friction zone. It is plausible that Chechen fighters who had transited from Pankisi through Georgia were attempting to reach Abkhazia via Kodori, which would have posed a triple threat to Russian interests.

The Alleged Incident: Russian Aircraft Bombing Kodori?

Cable 01 MOSCOW 13169 refers to reference cable B, TBILISI 3087, not available here but serving as its basis. In that cable, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi had reported that the Georgian Foreign Ministry accused Russia of sending combat aircraft across the international border, violating Georgian sovereign airspace, and bombing positions in the Kodori Gorge on October 28 and 29, 2001.

In legal terms, if the Georgian accusation were proven, it would have constituted an act of aggression under international law, a clear violation of sovereignty, and a serious diplomatic crisis. In opening his meeting with Mamedov on October 30, Ambassador Vershbow emphasized that incidents of this kind, if true and if continued, could "be disastrous for U.S.-Russian relations and spoil the upcoming summit meeting of our Presidents in the U.S." (paragraph 2).

This was a serious diplomatic warning. The United States had placed the incident in the first order of business — something capable of derailing the positive momentum in the Washington-Moscow relationship.

The Russian Response: "UFOs"

Mamedov's response was a blanket denial. He cited the Russian Ministry of Defense as categorically ruling out any involvement of Russian aircraft in incidents in Georgian airspace.

Later the same day, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow held a supplementary conversation with the chief of the Georgian desk at Russia's Foreign Ministry, Tereoken. Here comes the sentence that makes the entire cable an unforgettable piece of diplomatic writing. Tereoken said:

"Reports of planes in the area might as well have been about 'UFOs.'"

Tereoken went on to explain that Moscow "does not have the technical capability to determine whether there were foreign planes in the region." He added that he was "not accusing anyone," but that planes from "any side" might have been sent over Kodori.

This statement is remarkable at several levels. First, it acknowledges that some aerial incident did occur — Tereoken confirmed that Abkhaz helicopters had bombed areas "where the terrorists were." Second, it attempts to shift attribution from "Russian aircraft" to "aircraft from any party." Third, and here the diplomatic sleight of hand lies, it introduces "UFOs" as an alternative explanation. Tereoken's formulation offers three parallel options: Abkhaz helicopters (confirmed), unidentified non-Russian foreign aircraft (not ruled out), or "UFOs."

The Embassy's Assessment: "The Bold Lie"

The analytical judgment of the cable's authors (almost certainly the senior political staff under Ambassador Vershbow) is sharp and unequivocal. Paragraph 8 reads:

"To posit that they could be UFOs would be humorous if it were not for the seriousness of the violations. The high probability is that the Russians want to keep pressure on the Georgians and Chechens in the valley in an unsubtle effort to prevent those groups from moving into Abkhazia or Russia. Their official denials reflect a traditional Russian penchant to avoid an awkward admission with a bold lie."

The expression "bold lie" is a recognized diplomatic term used in sensitive correspondence to describe a technique in which, rather than a nuanced or evasive denial, the denial is delivered as comprehensive, forceful, and unambiguous — in full knowledge that it is false. The cable's authors note this is a Russian "tradition," not a one-off occurrence.

This assessment, bearing Ambassador Vershbow's signature, constitutes a professional declaration by experienced American diplomats. It leaves no doubt that in their view the "UFO" story was not a genuine attempt to account for a strange aerial phenomenon but a rhetorical technique to conceal military action. The phrase "humorous if it were not for the seriousness of the violations" captures exactly the tension between the absurdity of the Russian cover story and the real cost of the underlying action on the ground.

Analyzing the Use of UAP as a Cover Story

This cable is exceptional within the American diplomatic archive on UAP for one specific reason: it presents a case in which the term "UFO" was deployed as a diplomatic-rhetorical instrument rather than as a description of any sighting. In every other cable in the DOS-UAP series, the phenomenon is a genuine observation — civilians, military personnel, or diplomats describing something they saw and could not explain. Here, by contrast, a "UFO" is invoked by a foreign government official who does not himself believe in it, in order to resolve an entirely different kind of diplomatic problem.

UAP research must distinguish between two categories of report.

Category one: A genuine report of an observation of an unexplained phenomenon. Here "UFO" is raw data; the reporter genuinely cannot explain what was seen.

Category two: Verbal use of the term "UFO" as a cover story, deflection, or diplomatic humor. Here "UFO" is not an observation at all but a rhetorical device.

This cable falls unambiguously into the second category. Its value to UAP research lies not in any information about an aerial phenomenon but in what it reveals about how governments can deploy the UFO concept as a tool. This is a vital reminder for researchers: not every mention of "UFO" in an official document is a report of a genuine phenomenon. Sometimes it is a cover.

What Really Happened on October 28–29?

According to the Embassy's assessment, the real story is that Russian aircraft did carry out strikes in Kodori Gorge to pressure Chechen and Georgian groups in the area — an effort, as the cable puts it, to prevent those groups from moving into Abkhazia or Russia — and Moscow lied about it to avoid damaging the upcoming Bush-Putin summit. Historically, Russian military strikes in the Caucasus region continued in subsequent years; a similar incident occurred in 2002; and in 2008 the full-scale Russia-Georgia war broke out.

History supports Vershbow's assessment rather than Mamedov's denial.

Significance for UAP Research

This cable is important to the UAP archive for several reasons.

First, it is a documented example of a phenomenon previously described mainly through oral testimony: the deliberate use of the term "UFO" by an official government spokesperson to deflect attention or evade accountability.

Second, it illuminates a diagnostic tension that modern UAP researchers must keep in mind: when an official document mentions a UAP, the context must be examined. Is the person speaking genuinely reporting an observation? Or using the term as evasion?

Third, the cable provides historical documentation of American distrust of Russian denials about aerial phenomena. The term "bold lie" will appear again in other contexts of U.S.-Russian diplomatic correspondence.

Fourth, it sheds light on the cynical character of diplomacy in hot zones. In a situation where Russia bombed a foreign country and lied about it, the deployment of the "UFO" category does not impugn the credibility of the category itself but reveals how thoroughly it had become a familiar item in the rhetorical toolkit of states.

Summary

DOS-UAP-D3 is an exceptional document. Its subject line uses the word "UFO" in an almost provocative way: "UFOS OVER GEORGIA: STRANGE ENCOUNTERS OF AN MFA KIND." The subtitle plays on Spielberg's "Close Encounters of the Third Kind," but here "MFA" is the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the "strange encounters" are diplomatic, not extraterrestrial.

The cable documents how the Russian government, under diplomatic pressure, used the term "UFOs" not as an honest observation but as a language of evasion. The cable's authors were not deceived for a moment. They identified the rhetorical maneuver, called it a "bold lie," and committed that judgment to an official document that remained classified CONFIDENTIAL for twenty-five years.

From the standpoint of UAP research, the document is a weighted reminder: not every "UFO" in the archive is a sighting. Sometimes it is a cover. The sharp analysis of Vershbow, Mamedov, and Tereoken — and of the state of the Caucasus in 2001 — remains vivid and readable more than a quarter century after it was written.

---

Key People

Name	Role	Country
Alexander Vershbow	U.S. Ambassador to Moscow	United States
George Krol	Political Minister-Counselor (POLMINCOUNS), classified the cable	United States
Georgiy Mamedov	Russian Deputy Foreign Minister	Russia
Tereoken	Chief of the Georgian desk at Russia's Foreign Ministry; source of the "UFO" explanation	Russia
Sergey Ivanov	Russian Defense Minister (mentioned in the context of a possible visit to Tbilisi)	Russia
Zurab Zhvania	Chairman of the Georgian Parliament; visited Moscow October 25–28	Georgia
Gennadiy Seleznev	Chairman of the Russian Duma; met with Zhvania	Russia
Eduard Shevardnadze	President of Georgia	Georgia
Vladimir Putin	President of Russia	Russia
John Powers	Acting Director, U.S. Department of State — declassified the cable February 25, 2026	United States

Locations

• Kodori Gorge — Valley in the upper reaches of Abkhazia; the central friction zone in this cable. Approximate coordinates: 43.0167° N, 41.7833° E.
• Abkhazia — De facto breakaway Georgian province that declared independence after the 1992–1993 war; under Russian patronage.
• Tbilisi — Capital of Georgia; source of the accusation (REF B: TBILISI 3087).
• Moscow — Capital of Russia; scene of the Vershbow-Mamedov meeting and source of the denial.
• Gudauta — Russian military base in Abkhazia; subject of ongoing withdrawal negotiations. Approximately 600 Russian troops present; Moscow sought to retain 340 as "guards."
• Sukhumi — De facto capital of Abkhazia; where Russian General Staff personnel coordinated movements.
• Pankisi Gorge — Valley in northeastern Georgia; haven for Chechens and persistent point of contention between Moscow and Tbilisi.

Incidents

Incident	Date	Location	Cable paragraphs
Alleged bombing by Russian aircraft	October 28–29, 2001	Kodori Gorge, Abkhazia, Georgia	1, 2
Russian denial of involvement; "UFOs" invoked as possible explanation	October 30, 2001	Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow	3
First trainload of Russian equipment departing Gudauta for Russia	October 29, 2001	Gudauta base, Abkhazia	1, 4
Georgian parliamentary speaker Zhvania's visit to Moscow	October 25–28, 2001	Moscow	1, 6

Notable Quotes

"REPORTS OF PLANES IN THE AREA MIGHT AS WELL HAVE BEEN ABOUT 'UFOS.'" — Tereoken, chief of the Georgian desk at Russia's Foreign Ministry, paragraph 3

"MOSCOW DOES NOT HAVE THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WERE FOREIGN PLANES IN THE REGION." — Tereoken, paragraph 3

"TO POSIT THAT THEY COULD BE UFOS WOULD BE HUMOROUS IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE VIOLATIONS." — cable authors' assessment, paragraph 8 (COMMENT)

"THEIR OFFICIAL DENIALS REFLECT A TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN PENCHANT TO AVOID AN AWKWARD ADMISSION WITH A BOLD LIE." — cable authors' assessment, paragraph 8, signed: Vershbow

"SUCH INCIDENTS, IF TRUE, AND IF CONTINUED, COULD BE DISASTROUS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND SPOIL THE UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING OF OUR PRESIDENTS IN THE U.S." — Ambassador Vershbow to Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, paragraph 2