Army Air Forces General File, 1948: The Institutional Foundation of Project SIGN and the Flying Disc Investigation

Source file: 18_6369445_general_1948_vol_1.pdf Originating agency: U.S. Army Air Forces (Record Group 18 — AAF) Date range: January 1948 to June 1948 (with one document from September 1947) Page count: 28 (all read) High-significance pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28

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Official Blurb (from war.gov)

This file contains memorandums, correspondence, and forms related to the reporting of information on flying discs and investigations into sightings.

Summary

This file contains a collection of classified military correspondence from January through June 1948 documenting the establishment of the institutional framework for investigating the flying disc phenomenon within the U.S. Army Air Forces. It is effectively the administrative backbone of Project SIGN in its earliest stages, revealing how the Air Force's most senior generals created service-wide policy for collecting reports on unidentified objects, how they reached into captured German advanced-aircraft research (the Horten wings), and how they coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army, and allied nations. The documents include incident reports from multiple locations, internal debates over the correct investigative strategy, and directives for systematic examination of every witness account.

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Research Article

Introduction: 1948 and Project SIGN

The year 1948 was critical in the history of UAP investigation in the United States. In the wake of the reporting wave that broke in the summer of 1947 — particularly following the famous Kenneth Arnold incident of June 1947 — the U.S. Air Force recognized the need to establish an orderly mechanism for investigating the phenomenon. In December 1947, the commanding general of Air Materiel Command directed the opening of a project whose purpose was "to collect, collate, evaluate, and distribute to interested government agencies and contractors all information concerning sightings and phenomena in the atmosphere which can be construed to be of concern to the national security."

The project received the name SIGN, and the Air Force managed it. This file, appended to the Record Group 18 holdings, is one of the principal collections of internal correspondence generated during the project's first months of operation. More than any single file, it reveals the strategic thinking behind the project and the personalities of the key figures who ran it.

Command Structure and Correspondence Network

The bureaucratic structure revealed in this file is both complex and instructive. At the apex stands Major General George C. McDonald, Director of Intelligence for the Air Force, under whom reported directly Brigadier General C. P. Cabell, Chief of the Air Intelligence Requirements Division, who signed the majority of the documents in this file. Beneath him operated the following.

• Lt. Colonel Robert Taylor III, Chief, Collection Branch, Air Intelligence Requirements Division
• Lt. Colonel George D. Garrett Jr., Deputy Chief, Collection Branch, who appears as the direct author on most of the documents
• Lt. Colonel Douglas W. Eisman, Executive Director, Air Intelligence Requirements Division
• Lt. Colonel Wilton H. Earle Jr., another senior director within the Intelligence Division

All directive and transmittal documents passed through a body designated AFOIR-CO-5 (Air Force Office of Intelligence Requirements — Collection Officer 5), and were uniformly addressed to the Commanding General of Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for the attention of a unit called MCI (or TSDIN).

Collection Policy: The Cabell Directive of January–February 1948

The earliest documents in the file, dating to early 1948, record the formal codification of Air Force policy on flying disc reporting. On February 12, 1948, General Cabell dispatched a Routing and Record Sheet classified SECRET to the Director of Plans and Operations, requesting that all air installations maintain interceptor aircraft on continuous standby, fitted with gun cameras and appropriate armament, to photograph and document unexplained flying objects.

On February 27, 1948, Cabell formally notified the Army's Directorate of Intelligence (CSGID) of the general policy:

"It is Air Force policy not to ignore reports of sightings and phenomena in the atmosphere, but to recognize that part of its mission is to collect, collate, evaluate, and act on information of this nature."

The document stated that Air Materiel Command had been designated as the central collection and dissemination agency, and that all Air Force installations in the United States and Alaska had been directed to report all sightings directly to the commanding general at Wright-Patterson. In addition, all Army installations were required to report such occurrences directly to Air Materiel Command.

On March 3, 1948, Maj. Gen. S. E. Anderson, Director of Plans and Operations, replied that the interceptor standby proposal was not feasible, for three reasons.

1. The cost in aircraft and crew time was excessive relative to the probable yield.
2. A proper intercept was impossible except by chance without full radar coverage, which the Air Force was unable to provide.
3. It was doubtful whether fighter aircraft could effectively respond to reports that were, in most cases, originating from civilian sources.

This document is historically important: it shows that as early as the beginning of 1948 the military acknowledged that it was incapable of reliably intercepting the unidentified objects — which is consistent with claims that the objects demonstrated performance capabilities beyond the reach of existing technology.

On March 17, 1948, Cabell, having received the rejection, sent a revised document in more moderate language establishing the formal collection policy without requiring aircraft standby.

Reference to the Horten File: Connection to 1947 and German Technology

One of the most important documents in the file is a SECRET letter of September 24, 1947, signed by Colonel H. M. McCoy, Deputy for Intelligence (T-2) at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. The letter, addressed to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in Washington, accompanies a drawing of a "Loedding Flying Disc" designated LD-2, noting that for patent rights reasons everyone who examines the drawing must sign and describe their examination directly on the drawing.

The document also incorporates a report from the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Technical Note AERO 1703, describing the tailless aircraft designed by the Horten brothers. Senior officers were directed to review specific pages concerning the Horten brothers' perspective and their achievements in relation to "the flying saucer case."

More significantly, the letter discloses a remarkable intelligence finding: a report from the U.S. Military Attache in Moscow, USSR, dated June 9, 1947, indicating that 1,800 aircraft based directly or indirectly on the Horten VIII design (a six-push-engine bomber with a 131-foot wingspan and gross weight of approximately 33,000 pounds) are under construction for use in bomber squadrons. The Russian version, however, is jet-powered.

A subsequent document, a SECRET letter of June 4, 1948, signed by Lt. Colonel Earle Jr., confirms that a T-2 report entitled "German Flying Wings Designed by Horten Brothers" is on file in the office. This reinforces the case that the Air Force seriously investigated the possibility that some of the discs were German-designed aircraft in Soviet service.

Inter-Agency Coordination and Outreach to Regional Commands

The file contains evidence of broad-scope coordination among different bodies. On March 25, 1948, the General at Army intelligence headquarters (CSGID) requested that Air Materiel Command send a copy of all communications relating to flying disc reports directly to the Director of Army Intelligence. This shows that the Army sought immediate access to all information being collected.

On April 28, 1948, a file reference form was sent with the summary "Clippings Service for Project 'SIGN,'" addressed to Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson. This is one of the relatively rare instances in which the official name Project SIGN appears in an open document. The document is filed under file 380 Project.

On February 13 and February 12, 1948, two correspondence reference forms bearing the summaries "Project SIGN and Flying Discs" and "Project SIGN," addressed from the Air Intelligence Requirements Division to Air Materiel Command, also organized under file 380 Project.

On February 24, 1948, Cabell reported that contact had been made with the Horten brothers and that the Deputy for Intelligence G-2 in the European command had been prepared by telephone to use Collection Memorandum Number 7 as the basis for an interrogation of the Horten brothers. Results would be forwarded to Air Materiel Command as soon as received. This document confirms that U.S. military service in Germany did in fact interrogate the German inventors on the possibility that their aircraft design was the source of the disc sightings.

Specific Incidents: Field Evidence

The file contains documentation of several specific incidents.

Hobson, Ohio, May 1948 (pages 2–3): A SECRET letter of June 15, 1948, from headquarters of the Eleventh Air Force at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to the Air Force Chief of Staff. The report was transmitted on May 27, 1948, from Special Agent D. K. Brown of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cleveland, Ohio. Details of the incident:

• Location: Hobson, Ohio
• Time: Night of May 8, 1948
• Witnesses: Ben Hoff (New York Central Railroad inspector), Earl Housh (same occupation), Bob White (NYC yard clerk), J. C. Height (NYC police officer)
• Object description: Round shape, glowing (phosphorescent) color, apparent diameter of approximately nine inches from ground level
• Speed: "A great amount of speed"
• Heading: 90 degrees
• Altitude: 6 to 8 miles
• Trail: Phosphorescent trail in the sky

Bakersfield, California, March 1948 (pages 15–16): A report from headquarters of the Fourth Air Force at Hamilton Field, California, dated March 11, 1948, signed by Lt. Colonel Donald L. Springer. Two separate reports:

1. Mr. Les Buckner of Bakersfield witnessed two objects falling to earth between 16:10 and 16:55 on March 5, 1948. The description resembled a falling aircraft with a smoke and debris trail, heading southwest toward Buena Vista Lake, California.
2. Mr. Denio, an employee of Pacific General Electric Company, observed two objects fall to earth on March 8, 1948, north of Bakersfield. One appeared to be burning with a red and black smoke trail.

Search and rescue aircraft found nothing. An investigation was opened.

Houston, Texas, January 1948: A letter of January 7, 1948, from headquarters of the Tenth Air Force at Brooks Field, San Antonio, Texas, signed by Major Raymond D. Stephens. The report includes a summary of information prepared by the Tenth Air Force resident agent in Houston, Texas, covering a "flying disc" report received from the FBI office in Houston. The document appends a "Summary of Information, Subject: 'Flying Disc,' 175th AFBU, Ellington Field, dated December 19, 1947."

Canada (February 1948): A document of March 4, 1948, from Cabell, notes that an attached report from the Canadian Military Air Attache "closes" the incident reported by Johnson and Harrison. This is evidence that investigations included intelligence sharing with Canadian allied forces.

Tyndall Field, Florida, April 1948 (page 10): A letter of April 12, 1948, from headquarters of the 500th Air University Wing at Tyndall Air Force Base, Panama City, Florida, routed through Air University at Maxwell Field, Alabama. The report is submitted in compliance with the "Instruction for Reporting Information on 'Flying Discs'" of February 6, 1948.

Internal Dynamics: Debates and Bureaucratic Friction

One of the most interesting aspects of the file is what it reveals about the agency's internal dynamics. The March 1948 documents show friction between competing strategies.

General Cabell wanted to maintain aircraft on standby. General Anderson, Director of Plans, rejected this. Cabell accepted the rejection and continued building a reporting and collection system through administrative channels.

This debate is more than procedural. It shows that senior Air Force officials took the disc phenomenon seriously enough to consider deploying operational forces (fighter aircraft) to address it, even as others found that impractical.

Center of Gravity: Air Materiel Command and Wright-Patterson

Almost every document in this file passes through Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. This is the base where the Air Force's technical expertise was concentrated and where the T-2 (Technical Intelligence) unit operated. The fact that every report was addressed to either the MCI or TSDIN unit at that base underscores the technical-intelligence approach the Air Force took.

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Key People

• C. P. Cabell (Charles Pearre Cabell), Brig. Gen. — Chief, Air Intelligence Requirements Division; the dominant figure in collection policy. Later signed portions of Project SIGN documents. Subsequently served as Deputy Director of the CIA.
• George C. McDonald, Maj. Gen. — Director of Intelligence, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Signed the March 1948 standby document.
• S. E. Anderson, Maj. Gen. — Director of Plans and Operations; rejected the aircraft standby proposal.
• George D. Garrett Jr., Lt. Col. — Deputy Chief, Collection Branch; the direct author of most documents, who signed "Lt. Col. Garrett/dk/4544" on dozens of papers.
• Robert Taylor III, Colonel — Chief, Collection Branch; the officer directly responsible.
• Douglas W. Eisman, Lt. Col. — Executive Director, Air Intelligence Requirements Division; signed several transmittal documents.
• H. M. McCoy, Colonel — Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence (T-2), Wright Field, Dayton. Signed the September 1947 German/Horten document.
• Wilton H. Earle Jr., Lt. Col. — Intelligence Division; signed the June 1948 document.
• Donald L. Springer, Lt. Col. — AC of S, A-2, Headquarters Fourth Air Force; signed the Bakersfield incident reports.
• Raymond D. Stephens, Major — Deputy, Headquarters Tenth Air Force; reported the Houston incident.

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Locations

• Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio — Center of Project SIGN; all documents addressed here
• Washington 25, D.C. — USAF headquarters; origin of all general directives
• Harrisburg, Pennsylvania — Headquarters, Eleventh Air Force; source of the Hobson report
• Hobson, Ohio — Location of the May 8, 1948 night incident
• Cleveland, Ohio — FBI office that relayed the Hobson report to the Eleventh Air Force
• Bakersfield, California — Location of two falling-object reports, March 1948
• Hamilton Field, California — Headquarters, Fourth Air Force
• San Antonio, Texas (Brooks Field) — Headquarters, Tenth Air Force
• Houston, Texas — Location of the 1947–1948 incident
• Panama City, Florida (Tyndall Field) — 500th Air University Wing
• Montgomery, Alabama (Maxwell Field) — Air University
• Mitchell Field, New York — Air Defense Command
• Canada — Intelligence sharing with Canadian Military Air Attache

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Incidents

Incident	Date	Location	Pages
Phosphorescent round object, 6–8 miles altitude	Night of May 8, 1948	Hobson, Ohio	2–3
Two objects falling to earth, Buckner witness	March 5, 1948	Bakersfield, California	15–16
Burning object with smoke trail, Denio witness	March 8, 1948	North of Bakersfield, California	15–16
Johnson and Harrison incident (detailed in Canadian annex)	Not stated	Canada	22
Flying disc, Ellington Field (175th AFBU witness)	December 19, 1947	Houston, Texas	21
Information report on "flying disc"	January 15, 1948	California (Fourth AF)	27

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Notable Quotes

Air Force policy (Cabell, February 27, 1948): "It is Air Force policy not to ignore reports of sightings and phenomena in the atmosphere, but to recognize that part of its mission is to collect, collate, evaluate, and act on information of this nature."

On interceptor standby (Anderson, March 3, 1948): "The Air Materiel Command's proposal to place fighter aircraft at all bases on a basis of continuous standby is not considered feasible for the following reasons... a proper intercept is impossible, except by chance, without full radar coverage which the Air Force is unable to provide."

On the Horten file (McCoy, September 24, 1947): "Attached herewith is also a report prepared by the Royal Aircraft Establishment... describing the Horten tailless aircraft. The following references are suggested for perusal, which relate to the Horten brothers' perspective and the relation of their thinking and achievements to the alleged 'flying saucer' case."

On Soviet aircraft production (McCoy, September 24, 1947): "A recent report from the U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, USSR, dated 9 June 1947, indicates that 1,800 aircraft... based directly or indirectly on the Horten VIII design... are under construction for use in bomber squadrons."

On coordinating with the Horten brothers (Cabell, February 24, 1948): "This directorate has been notified that contact has been made with the Horten brothers, and that the Deputy for Intelligence G-2 in the European command has accordingly been prepared by telephone to use this memorandum as the basis of an investigation."

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Significance

This file is one of the earliest and most comprehensive documentation repositories for the inception of Project SIGN. It establishes beyond question the following.

1. Project SIGN was an official project with clear management lines, run by officers at the major general level and encompassing cooperation with the FBI, the Army, and allied nations.

2. The Soviet-German question was investigated in earnest, including a physical interrogation of the Horten brothers in Germany on the possibility that the discs were German-designed aircraft in Soviet service.

3. The Air Force acknowledged the limits of its capability, having rejected a proposal to maintain aircraft on standby on the grounds that an intercept would be impossible without full radar coverage.

4. Official policy was to collect and evaluate all reports, which placed Project SIGN as an integral part of the national security mission.

5. Reports contained technically anomalous details — such as round objects at 6–8 miles altitude with phosphorescent trails and extraordinary speed — that could not be interpreted as flight by any aircraft of the period.

This file, combined with other documents from the same period, creates a picture of a government that took the phenomenon seriously, tried to understand it through existing conceptual frameworks (German technology, Soviet aircraft), and simultaneously developed systematic collection mechanisms to accumulate evidence for future analysis.