USG-UAP-D002: Who Gets the Pieces? The 1962-1964 White House Fight over Recovered Space Fragments

Source file: USG-UAP-D002-Interagency_Correspondence_Concerning_Space_Fragments-1962_1964.pdf Originating agency: Executive Office of the President: National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) and National Security Council staff, with NASA, CIA and Defense papers; held by the LBJ Library (National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson, Box 018, folder "Space Vehicle Fragments - Responsibilities and Procedures") Document type: File of memoranda, draft policy papers, draft public statements, meeting attendance lists, handwritten notes, receipts and NASA press guidance Date: 2 October 1962 to 26 May 1964 Classification: Mostly Confidential (the 1964 SA-6 guidance is Confidential, Group 1); the April 1964 query sheet is marked Secret, Group 3, and a NASA Secret cover sheet is included; declassified 2009 and 2014 (NARA stamps); released in 2026 Page count: 72 VIRIN: 260508-O-D0360-1171 PURSUE Release: 7

Summary

This file is a working folder kept by Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council staff. It records how, from October 1962, the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) under Executive Secretary Edward C. Welsh tried to settle a question no statute answered: when a piece of a spacecraft, American or foreign, lands on U.S. soil or is handed to the United States, which agency gets it, who analyses it, who talks to the press, and what happens to it afterwards.

The folder holds the paper trail of that effort almost draft by draft. A one-page draft public statement prepared for a meeting on 17 October 1962 grew into two linked papers: a short public statement naming NASA as the responsible agency, and a confidential "Guidelines for Interagency Handling of Space Vehicle Fragments" for use inside the government. The two papers did not say the same thing. The public text promised that foreign fragments would be held by NASA "pending final arrangements for their return to the launching country". The internal text opened its foreign-fragment paragraph with "To insure prompt analysis for intelligence purposes".

The drafts were revised in October and November 1962, rewritten by the Department of Defense on 1 March 1963, objected to by NASA and questioned by the CIA, which had not been invited to the key meeting. By October 1963 Welsh complained that "more than sufficient time" had passed and called the agency heads back. The latest papers, from April and May 1964, are NASA press guidance for questions about falling debris from the SA-5 and SA-6 Saturn launches. Nothing in the file shows a final, signed policy.

Research Article

The question Welsh put to the White House

The earliest document (page 68) is Welsh's memo of 2 October 1962 to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; an identical memo went to NASA Administrator James E. Webb (page 67). It states the problem in one sentence: there is "need for a decision as to what government agencies should have what responsibilities in regard to obtaining, analyzing, and identifying fragments or suspected fragments from space vehicles which fall on U.S. territory or which otherwise come into U.S. possession." Welsh adds that "There are legal as well as operational problems involved", and asks each agency to name a representative.

A draft statement for a meeting at 2:30 p.m. on 17 October 1962 in Room 218 of the Executive Office Building (pages 64, 71, 72) is the first version of the policy. NASA would be "responsible for obtaining, analyzing, and identifying any fragments or suspected fragments from space vehicles of all types", including fragments "turned over to the United States by foreign countries". The "only exception" was hardware from Defense launches. Foreign fragments would be held by NASA "pending final arrangements for their return to the launching country."

Johnson did not attend. His telecon note of 17 October (page 62) records that he called R. W. Hale of the Space Council staff, stated his "concurrence and support of the designation of NASA", and proposed turning the text into a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) "in order to get the program under way, even though Justice and State might still have some legal and substantive questions."

Two papers, two audiences

On 22 October 1962 Welsh sent the AEC, Defense, Justice, NASA and State two drafts (page 57): "One is intended for consideration as a public release, and the other as a paper of intra-governmental understanding." The public draft, dated 18 October and marked Official Use Only (page 58), carries a handwritten addition after "return to the launching country": "or other appropriate disposition".

The internal paper (Attachment B, pages 59-60) is more candid. Its paragraph 5 says Defense will alert NASA to expected deorbits and collection teams, and adds: "Any such objects obtained are to be returned initially to NASA. Subsequent handling will be in accordance with existing intelligence collection procedures." The Atomic Energy Commission was to analyse fragments that had carried radioactive materials "as well as taking responsibility for the radioactive materials themselves"; the Smithsonian Institution could keep collecting and analysing fragments under contract; and State would advise on returning fragments "to the country where such fragments were recovered or to the country responsible for launching the original vehicle."

Johnson's reply of 23 October (page 53) pushed the disposition phrase into the public statement as well: "I frankly can't see why the State Department should choke on having it in the public statement. It stands to reason that if we believe the satellite were hostile that we would not return it to its point of origin." He attached the guidelines recast as a draft NSAM (pages 54-55), opening "The President has approved the following procedures:" and addressed to NASA, State, Defense, the CIA, the AEC, the Smithsonian, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Space Council. Welsh thanked him the next day for "the re-structuring of the guidelines paper" (page 52).

November 1962: the "agreed" drafts

The 1 November 1962 drafts (pages 46-51, 69-70) dropped the explicit "intelligence collection procedures" sentence and moved the intelligence purpose into paragraph 3: "To insure prompt analysis for intelligence purposes, NASA will give the DOD access, as expeditiously as possible, to fragments which are readily identifiable as coming from space vehicles launched from foreign countries", after which Defense would turn them over to NASA. One copy (pages 46-47) bears handwritten edits. Welsh's covering memo of 2 November (page 48) reports that the public statement needed only the added words "or for other appropriate disposition", while the internal paper had changes "of some significance", and called a final meeting.

That meeting was held at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday 6 November 1962 in Room 213 of the Executive Office Building. The attendance list (page 45) names representatives of the AEC, Defense, Justice, NASA, the NSC, the Office of Science and Technology, the Space Council and State. No one from the CIA is listed. A pencilled note (page 44) records the outcome on the public statement: "Clearance by White House for release by NASA. NASA to publicize the program." The 6 November texts (pages 36-38, 41-43) gave Defense "and other responsible agencies" access to foreign fragments, gave State guidance over fragments "made available to the United States by foreign countries", and made NASA the focal point for "the coordination and release" of public information. Welsh sent them to Johnson the same day as "revised and agreed to at today's meeting" (page 35).

The CIA objects, and Defense rewrites

Agreement did not last. On 7 December 1962 Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, answered Welsh's 28 November request (page 34): "Review of these documents has clearly indicated that the interagency handling of space vehicle fragments is of interest and concern to the United States intelligence community." He placed the papers before the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) for its 12 December meeting. Johnson's memo of 10 December to Thomas Parrott (page 32) calls it a "small hassel between DOD and CIA" and adds: "As far as I am concerned it is a 'tempest in a tea cup' that would have been avoided entirely if the Space Council would have brought the Agency into the ad hoc committee from the beginning." A handwritten reply (page 33) begins "Chuck - agree with your remarks."

The Defense revision of 1 March 1963 (pages 18-19, marked with brackets for deletions and underlining for additions; clean copies on pages 27-28 and 30-31, sent to Johnson on 4 March, page 29) shifted weight to the Pentagon. NASA would now receive and identify fragments, with "analyzing" struck out. The Department of Defense became "solely responsible" for its own hardware. Paragraph 3 now read: "To insure prompt analysis for intelligence purposes, NASA and other U.S. Government agencies will deliver to the DoD as expeditiously as possible and on a priority basis fragments (including whole vehicles) which are readily identifiable or suspect as coming from vehicles launched from foreign countries." Foreign items reaching Defense first would be "retained by DoD for analysis". State gained a new role: to "provide assistance in the acquisition of fragments that fall on foreign territory." Defense would also issue its own press releases on its own hardware. A marked-up public statement (page 21) notes: "Delete bracketed words to conform to DOD revisions of paper dated March 1, 1963."

NASA's response is an undated letter from Arnold W. Frutkin, Director of International Programs (page 25). NASA accepted dropping "analyzing" "with the clear understanding that fragment identification may in fact require laboratory analysis", but wanted "and other US government agencies" and the DoD-retention sentence removed as inconsistent with NASA's designation as the receiving agency, and deleted the Smithsonian paragraph as "exclusively" an internal NASA matter. On 31 May 1963 Welsh wrote to CIA Director John A. McCone, as USIB chairman, that the Defense paper had "top-level Defense clearance" but "has not been coordinated within the intelligence community", and asked for a reply (page 26). Two days earlier his staffer Hale had found Frutkin "very negative on the project"; that memo is published separately as EOP-UAP-D002. An undated pencilled note in the file (page 22) asks: "Did USIB take any final action at or since their December meeting?"

1963-1964: a stalled policy and the Saturn launches

By 24 October 1963 Welsh wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McCone, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, Office of Science and Technology Director Jerome B. Wiesner, Webb and Bundy (pages 23-24) that agreement "was initially obtained" but "some variations in preferred language developed". Answering Chairman Miller of the House Science and Astronautics Committee about a bill on the subject, Webb had said legislation was not needed because the matter was under study in the Executive Branch. "There has been more than sufficient time elapsed", Welsh wrote, and called a meeting for 6 November 1963. A new draft followed on 15 November (page 15, attachment not in the file), with a meeting on 21 November. Its attendance list (page 17) shows the CIA now present. The LBJ Library withdrawal sheets (pages 1-2) list several November 1963 drafts of the guidelines as withheld items.

The rest of the file shows NASA handling the issue without a signed policy. A Confidential diary note of 16 December 1963 by James R. Morrison of NASA's Office of International Programs (pages 7-9) covers the SA-5 Saturn launch. NASA had swapped the planned lead and iron ballast for "13,000 lbs. of sand" and roughed up the Jupiter nose cone so it would burn up. It gave a 95 percent chance that 2,800 lbs would come back in "30 to 39 fragments, consisting of six engines, three Titanium spheres and approximately 30 electronics packages". The note estimates the odds of a casualty at "one casualty per 50,000 flights", says destroying the satellite in orbit would need "a nuclear charge", and notes that "Most fragments collected to date have been stainless steel pieces of Atlas skin." A Secret question-and-answer sheet of 8 April 1964 for NASA's top three officials (pages 12-14) has the casualty odds (SA-5: one in 50,000; GT-1: one in 27,500) struck through by hand, with a marginal note of deletions per Mr. Hausman. A 26 May 1964 routing slip from William F. Hausman to Johnson (page 3) says "Underlined sections have been added since the last draft." It goes with Julian Scheer's teletype guidance on the SA-6 booster (pages 4-6), which instructs: "NO INFORMATION IS BEING VOLUNTEERED."

What the file does not say

The words "UFO", "unidentified" and "flying saucer" do not appear anywhere in the 72 pages. The subject is man-made hardware, and the only foreign hardware the file implies is Soviet ("Soviet vehicles which have already decayed", page 8). No specific recovered fragment, recovery site or analysis result is described. The file is relevant to UAP history only because of its framing: every draft covers "fragments, or suspected fragments", and the 1964 press line (page 5) says that after a reported impact "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DOES THIS AGENCY (GOVERNMENT) CONJECTURE ON THE ORIGIN OF AN OBJECT. RATHER, IT DESIRES TO OBTAIN, ANALYZE, AND ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE ORIGIN OF SUCH AN OBJECT." On the official description's point about material of undetermined origin: in every version here, paragraph 4 leaves "All other fragments" with NASA. What changed was the March 1963 Defense wording, which sent material merely "suspect" as foreign to Defense first. Several pages are routing slips, receipts, a Secret cover sheet and near-blank sheets, and some November 1963 drafts remain withdrawn.

Significance

This is a rare, detailed look at how the early-1960s Executive Branch tried to govern objects falling from orbit. The surviving drafts show a split from the very first weeks: a reassuring civilian public face (NASA receives everything and returns foreign pieces) beside an internal track built around intelligence exploitation ("existing intelligence collection procedures", "prompt analysis for intelligence purposes", whole vehicles delivered to DoD "on a priority basis"). The file also records the bureaucratic forces that kept the policy unsigned: Defense against NASA over custody, the CIA's late entry through USIB, State's diplomatic concerns, and NASA's reluctance to invite congressional debate. For UAP research its value is as precedent. It shows how the government framed custody of objects of uncertain origin long before modern UAP policy, and it shows concretely that in 1962-1964 the government's stated rule was to obtain and analyse an object before saying anything about where it came from.

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Key Concepts

Notable Quotes

"It has been suggested that there is need for a decision as to what government agencies should have what responsibilities in regard to obtaining, analyzing, and identifying fragments or suspected fragments from space vehicles which fall on U.S. territory or which otherwise come into U.S. possession." -- page 68

"One is intended for consideration as a public release, and the other as a paper of intra-governmental understanding." -- page 57

"Any such objects obtained are to be returned initially to NASA. Subsequent handling will be in accordance with existing intelligence collection procedures." -- page 55

"It stands to reason that if we believe the satellite were hostile that we would not return it to its point of origin." -- page 53

"Review of these documents has clearly indicated that the interagency handling of space vehicle fragments is of interest and concern to the United States intelligence community." -- page 34

"As far as I am concerned it is a 'tempest in a tea cup' that would have been avoided entirely if the Space Council would have brought the Agency into the ad hoc committee from the beginning." -- page 32

"On March 1, a revised classified internal paper (Tab A), which has had top-level Defense clearance was provided, but we now understand it has not been coordinated within the intelligence community." -- page 26

"UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES DOES THIS AGENCY (GOVERNMENT) CONJECTURE ON THE ORIGIN OF AN OBJECT. RATHER, IT DESIRES TO OBTAIN, ANALYZE, AND ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE ORIGIN OF SUCH AN OBJECT." -- page 5